COMMENTS
Application of the Federal Securities Laws to
Noncontributory, Defined Benefit Pension Plans
Since 1875, when the American Express Company first established a plan for providing retirement benefits to disabled, elderly
workers,' an increasing number of employers in the United States
have resorted to the use of private pension plans to provide additional benefits for their employees. 2 The majority of these pension
plans are "noncontributory" plans, financed entirely by the employer or the organization sponsoring the plan.3 Furthermore, the
vast majority are "defined benefit" plans, under which the retirement benefits to be received by the employee are fixed, and the
employer's contribution to the pension fund is adjusted to whatever
level is necessary to provide those benefits.'
The astonishing increase in the size and number of private
See 1 M. LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 2021 (1932). See also W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27 (1976).
2 See N. TUBE, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 1, 13-58 (1976): "In 1940, 4.1
million employees . . . participated in private pension plans; in 1973, the number had increased more than eightfold to 33.1 million employees." Id. at 1.
3 Seventy-seven percent of the pension plans originating in the period from 1875 to 1929,
and still operating in 1929, were noncontributory. Moreover, these noncontributory plans
covered over 95 percent of all pension plan participants. 1 M. LATIMER, supra note 1, at 31.
One commentator has suggested that the majority of early pension plans were noncontributory because such plans offered "the advantages, at least in the opinion of the managements, of not complicating relations with trade unions, retaining full control of retirements
and final judgment on the fulfillment of qualifications, discouraging strikes, and permitting
retirement for the good of the service and the public safety." Id. at 44. A recent study has
found that more than 75 percent of all pension plans are financed entirely by employer
contributions. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF 178,670 PLANS ON FILE JANUARY 1,
1973, at 5 (1973). The predominance of noncontributory plans today is undoubtedly explained
by the favorable tax treatment accorded "qualified" pension plans. See I.R.C. § 404. See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(i), T.D. 6887, 1966-2 C.B. 129.
1 This comment will deal only with defined benefit plans since they comprise about 90%
of all pension plans. See Study Group of 1933 Act-General Subcommittee on Daniel, et al.
v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, A Report to the Committee on FederalRegulation
of Securities, 32 Bus. LAw. 1925, 1930 (1977). Pension plans which are not defined benefit
plans are defined contribution plans. Under a defined contribution plan each participant in
the plan has an individual account. Pension benefits are based solely on the contributions
made to the participant's account plus all income, expenses, gains, and losses attributable
to the account plus any forfeitures of accounts of other participants that are allocated to the
participant's account. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [hereinafter
cited as ERISA] § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (Supp. V 1975),
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pension plans- has led quite naturally to an increase in the number
of abuses and disputes surrounding them.' Congress attempted to
deal with many of these abuses by enacting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).1 Recently, the Seventh
Circuit, in Daniel v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,8 accepted the argument that the federal securities laws provide additional remedies, and held that noncontributory pension plans are
subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
This comment examines legislative history and Supreme Court
"investment contract" precedent in order to determine whether the
federal securities laws are applicable to noncontributory, defined
benefit pension plans.'
I.

THE STATUTES AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

A transaction does not fall within the scope of either the SecuriIn 1940, assets of private pension plans were estimated to be $2.4 billion. By 1973 these
assets had grown to $150 billion; estimates for 1980 indicate that assets will probably exceed
$250 billion. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1973). Moreover, these figures understate the magnitude of private pension plan liabilities. Assets of private pension plans represent only the funded portion of private pension plan liabilities. Reported unfunded liabilities
are currently in excess of $50 billion. Indeed, as noted by one commentator: "There is reason
to believe . . . that the reported figures are ridiculously understated. Unfunded liabilities
might actually come to several hundred billion dollars." Ehrbar, Those Pension Plans Are
Even Weaker Than You Think, FORTUNE, November, 1977, at 104.
' See S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1973). One commentator, for example,
stated that:
Prior to the Pension Reform Act [ERISA], Congressional debates, television programs,
the news media, and many articles and books spotlighted certain defects of private
pension plans, emphasizing in particular the plight of individuals without pension benefits after years of plan membership. Some of the horrible examples included workers who
just missed their pension by not having enough service with their employer, some who
worked for an employer whose business failed or was taken over by another concern,
some who lost their job before benefits vested. But the message was the same-insecurity
for the individual in old age.
W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, supra note 1, at 154.
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975)).
561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 6,
1977) (Nos. 77-753 & 77-754). Other recent decisions have reached a contrary result. Wiens
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,005 (C.D. Cal.
March 28, 1977); Hurn v. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus., 424
F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Cf. Robinson v. UMW Health and Retirement Funds, 435 F.
Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977) (dismissing federal securities law claim in context of employee
welfare benefit plan litigation).
, It is *ell established that employee interests in contributoryprivate pension plans, at
least in some circumstances, are subject to the federal securities laws. See generally
Mundheim & Henderson, The Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and
Profit-SharingPlans, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 795 (1964). For this reason, this comment
will deal only tangentially with contributory plans.
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ties Act of 1933'" or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," unless it
involves a "sale" or "offer for sale" of a "security." The term
"security" is defined in section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933:
[The term' "security" means any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security,"
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
2
foregoing.'
the
of
any
purchase,
or
to
right to subscribe
A similar definition of "security" appears in section 3(a)(10) of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act,' 3 and the courts have held that the
two definitions are substantially equivalent."
This definition of "security" does not, at first glance, seem to
include employees' interests in noncontributory private pension
plans. Section 2(1) does not mention the terms "employee interest,"
"noncontributory private pension plan," or even "pension" or
"retirement benefits." However, this does not foreclose the possibility that pension plans are encompassed within the statutory definition.
The legislative histories of the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934
, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
,1This section states:
When used in this title unless the context otherwise requires(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as
a "security" or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance which has a7 maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
" See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967).
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Securities Exchange Act provide little guidance in resolving the
issue; there is no mention of pension plans in any of the congressional discussions prior to the passage of the Acts. " While this may
reflect the fact that "pension plans were still a rarity" in the
1930's, 11 it does not necessarily follow that Congress specifically intended to exclude such plans from the definition of "security." Congress was primarily concerned with enacting legislation to curb
"serious abuses" in the capital markets 7-abuses generally occurring in connection with "the sale of securities to raise capital for
profit-making purposes."' 8 Because of the relative insignificance of
pension plan abuses at that time, it is probable that Congress gave
little, if any, thought to the question whether interests in pension
plans are securities under section 2(1).
In 1934, several amendments to the 1933 Act were proposed, 9
including a provision specifically exempting from registration "an
offering made solely to employees of an issuer or its affiliates in
connection with a bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation or stock-investment plan for the exclusive benefit of such
employees. ' 20 This provision, however, was eventually rejected by
the House-Senate Conference Committee because the Committee
believed that "the participants in employees' stock-investment
plans may be in as great need of protection afforded by availability
of information concerning the issuer for which they work as are most
'2
other members of the public." '
This statement indicates that the Conference Committee
viewed interests in employee stock-investment plans as "securities"
within the meaning of section 2(1). Since the committee's only explicit reference was to "stock-investment plans,"s it cannot be assumed that the committee would have necessarily concluded that
noncontributory, defined benefit pension plans were also subject to
the Act. Stock-investment plans, by their very nature, are closely
related to the types of securities explicitly covered by section 2(1)
because stock-investment plans generally involve a direct investment by the employee in the stock of his employer's company.2
" See, e.g., Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1237 (7th Cir.
1977), petitionfor cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1977) (Nos. 77-753 & 77-754).
" Id. at 1241.
1 United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).

Id.

' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
2*78 CoNG. REc. 8708 (1934).
23 H.R. RFP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
" Id.
13See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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Employees who participate in such plans are as much in need of full
disclosure as any other investor. 24 Pension plans, by contrast, do not
involve a direct employee investment in a security. Although the
pension funds may be invested in securities, the employees covered
under a noncontributory, defined benefit pension plan have only a
claim to pension benefits. Thus, the need for disclosure may be
substantially less.
In 1941, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed
amendments exempting specific types of pension plans from the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act. 2 Although none of these
amendments were enacted, industry reaction to the proposals indicates that these plans were not generally thought to be securities
within the meaning of section 2(1). No industry witness testified on
behalf of the amendments.? Indeed, several industry witnesses testified against them and "argued that Congress should not adopt the
amendments because adoption would have the effect of sanctioning
the Commission's construction of the act and would thus cause the
act to become applicable to any employee plan which did not meet
the terms of any exemption granted pursuant to the amendments." The failure of Congress to enact the amendments, however, indicates little about its view of the pension plan question
because American involvement in World War II foreclosed serious
consideration of the matter.Y
More recent legislative action might be taken to suggest that
Congress views all pension interests as securities. Section 27(b) of
the Investment Company Amendments Act of 19701o amended the
1933 Securities Act by exempting certain classes of "securities"
from the registration requirements of section 5,31 including
24 Id.

21 For example, the early SEC position was that there was no sale of a noncontributory
pension interest because there was "no element of volition on the part of the employees
Op. SEC Ass't Gen. Counsel (1941), 1 PENS. PLAN GUIDE
whether or not to participate. . . ...
(CCH) T 1104.101. According to one commentator, the SEC's position was "that if the employee has no real choice with respect to the medium in which his funds are invested there
would be only a limited usefulness in requiring disclosure." Mundheim & Henderson, supra
note 9, at 807-08.
2 See Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and to the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934: Hearings before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 907-08, 950 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Hearings].
21 Mundheim & Henderson, supra note 9, at 811-12.
2, Id.
29 Id.

at 811.

3 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1434 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970)).
31 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
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any interest or participation in a single or collective trust fund
maintained by a bank or in a separate account maintained by
an insurance company which interest or participation is issued
in connection with . . . a stock bonus, pension, or profitsharing plan which meets the requirements for qualification
1
under 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ....
It could be argued that Congress's labeling of pension plan
interests as "securities" for the purposes of the section 3(a) exemption-after its rejection of similar amendments-evidences its belief
that all such interests fall within the section 2(1) definition of a
security.Y Other considerations suggest that this was not the case.
First, the main purpose of the amendment was to codify previous
Commission practices in exempting certain pension interests from
the filing and registration requirements of the 1933 Act.3 4 Although
section 3(a) refers to pension interests as securities, the amendment
was intended to assure concerned parties that registration would not
be required; it was not intended to aid in defining the term
"security." Pension interests may have been included within the
general exemption clause merely as a matter of convenience. Secondly, the draftsmanship of the 1970 amendments strongly counsels
against searching its terms for evidence of considered legislative
judgment on matters collateral to the purposes of the legislation. It
35
is widely acknowledged that the 1970 Act is not a model of clarity;
indeed, it was amended within a week of its enactment in order to
forestall possible misinterpretations. 3 In view of the Act's general
imprecision, it is doubtful whether Congress carefully considered
the various types of pension interests and concluded that each is a
security under section 2(1).
Aside from the 1970 legislation, there is nothing to suggest that
Congress views pension plan interests in general as subject to the
securities acts. Indeed, the conclusion to be drawn from the legislative history of those acts that specifically focus on employee benefit
interests is that Congress believed there was "no Federal Statute,
regulation or authority" that provided protection for pension plan
32 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1434. The Act specifically refers to these interests

as "securities."
11Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for
cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1977) (Nos. 77-753 & 77-754).
1, Op. SEC Ass't Gen. Counsel, supra note 25, at 1104.101.
35See, e.g., Friedman, The Securities Act of 1933 and Employee CompensationPlans,
in FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcURrEs REGULATION 353, 368 (1973).
" Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970).
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beneficiaries.3 For example, during hearings on the Welfare Pension
Plan Disclosure Act of 195 9,8 Senator John Kennedy dramatized
the problem by contrasting the general "inadequacies of safeguards" 39 designed to protect employee benefit plans with "the protection furnished comparable large-scale public savings and investments by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1933 [sic], the Investment Company Act of 1940,
and so forth.

'4

The absence of comprehensive protection provided

the impetus for the federal legislative efforts resulting in ERISA.4 '
The Senate Report on that legislation stated that "[p]ension...
plans are exempt from coverage under the Securities Act of 1933
• . .unless the plan is a voluntary contributory pension plan and
invests in the securities of the employer company2an amount greater
than that paid into the plan by the employer.

In sum, the relevant legislative history of the securities acts and
employee benefits legislation suggests that Congress never definitively indicated whether noncontributory pension plan interests are
securities. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has stated,
"Congress did not attempt to articulate the relevant economic criteria" 3 for determining if a particular interest is or is not a security.
Thus, "the task has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission and.

. .

ultimately to the federal courts to decide which of the

myriad financial transactions
in our society come within the cover44
age of these statutes.
IX.

THE SEC AND THE COURTS

A. The Position of the SEC
The SEC has consistently taken the position that interests in
employee benefit plans are securities.4 5 In 1941, the Commission

11S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1956).
"
29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1970) (repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 § 111(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (Supp.
V 1975))).
11S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958).

40 Id.
'

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975).

"INTERIM

REPORT OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, S. REP. No. 634,

92d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1971). The final report adopted the INTERIM REPORT as a "complete
description of the federal regulation affecting the administration of private [pension] plans
." S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
" United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 (1975).
Id. at 848.
15The SEC first adopted this position in 1934, in response to the congressional rejection
of an amendment that would have exempted stock investment plans from the registration
provisions of the 1933 Act. See text and notes at notes 19-21 supra.
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advocated congressional adoption of an amendment to the 1933 Securities Act that would have explicitly exempted certain pension
plans from the registration requirements of section 5.46 The Commission also supported an amendment delegating to it the power to
exempt benefit plans, including pension plans, pursuant to its rulemaking authority." At the same time, however, the SEC opposed
another proposal to remove all pension plans qualifying under what
is now section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code from the definition
of "security. 4 8 The Commission's opposition to this sweeping exemption is consistent with its support for limited exemptions from
registration and clearly indicates its belief that interests in certain
kinds of benefit plans should be afforded protection under the securities acts. Although these amendments were never enacted,4 9 an
opinion of counsel issued in 1941 formally expressed the Commission's view that certain interests in benefit plans were "securities." 5
The opinion stated that "the security which is involved within the
meaning of section 2(1) of [the 1933 Act] in connection with the
offer or sale of interests on certain types of plans is normally an
51
'investment contract."'
In testimony at a Senate subcommittee hearing on ERISA,
former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen explained the Commission's view:
In many respects, pension plans and mutual funds have features in common. . . .First, both investor and employee are
investing money which they have earned. There is no gratuity
involved. Realistically, the employee is simply putting into a
fund for his future use that which he would otherwise get in his
paycheck. And the employer finds it to be in his interest to
contribute to that fund and to do so under circumstances which
will stimulate contributions by his employees. Both the investor and the employee-and the employer-place their confidence and trust in an administrator who is in a position to exercise expert judgment concerning the management of their
funds.52

"

1941 Hearings,supra note 26, at 907-08, 950.

47Id.
'

Id. at 919-20.

' See text and note at note 29 supra.

Op. SEC Ass't Gen. Counsel, supra note 25, at 1104.101.
stId.
52 Hearingson S. 3598 Before the Subcomm. on Laborof the Senate Comm. on Labor &
Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1972).

132
B.
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The Courts

The SEC's determination that interests in private pension
plans are normally "securities" was based on the view that such
interests are a species of "investment contract" as that term is used
in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act. 3 In the recent case of Daniel v.
4 the Seventh Circuit held
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,"
that interests in noncontributory pension plans are "investment
contracts"5 for the purposes of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
1. The Investment Contract Concept. Although the term
"investment contract" appears in the definition of "security" in
both the 1933 and 1934 securities acts, neither act defines the term. 6
As originally employed in state securities legislation, the term applied only to certain out-of-state land sales. 57 However, the scope of
the concept expanded when state courts began to recognize that
"investment contract" could be transposed into "contract which is
an investment. '58 Current interpretations of the term in the context
of the federal securities laws have retained this broader scope so
that, as one commentator has noted, "investment contract" is the
"'catchall that isn't otherwise caught' provision" 59 of the securities
acts.
The leading case defining "investment contract" for purposes
of the federal securities laws is SEC v. W.J. Howey Co."0 In Howey,
a land sales corporation sold small tracts of citrus grove land to
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were simultaneously offered cultivation
and marketing services to be provided by a corporation controlled
by the sales corporation, and the two contracts were found to constitute a single investment in the agricultural venture." Noting that
"investment contract" had generally been defined under state law
as "the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended
-"See text and notes at notes 12-14 supra.
5,561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 6,
1977) (Nos. 77-753 & 77-754).
1 Id. at 1231.
5615 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). The term "investment contract," as well as the entire definition of "security" found in the 1933 Act, were taken virtually
verbatim from the third tentative draft of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act, which appeared
in 1927. See Note, Pension Plans as Securities, 96 U. PA. L. Rlv. 549, 553 (1948).
57See Note, Pension Plansas Securities, 96 U. PA. L. Rlv.549, 553 (1948).
" See, e.g., State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922); State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
11Bloomenthal, The Many Faces of a Security, 22 PRAc. LAw. 45 (1976).
90328 U.S. 293 (1946).
61Id. at 299-300.
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to secure income or profit from its employment, 8 2 the Court held
that "an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."
The investment contract test formulated in Howey has changed
slightly in recent years. Several decisions have somewhat relaxed
the requirement that profits be produced "solely" by the efforts of
others. The Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises,
Inc.,6" held that an investment contract exists if profits are expected
to derive from the "essential managerial efforts of third parties."6
Although the Supreme Court has not squarely approved this standard, it has recently stated that "[tlhe touchstone [of an investment contract] is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."" Thus, in
order to satisfy the Howey "investment contract" test, as revised,
there must be a finding of (1) an investment (2) in a common enterprise (3) with the expectation of profits (4) derived from the managerial efforts of third parties.
Some courts and commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court's recent decision in United Housing Foundation,Inc.
v. Forman8 represents a shift in emphasis by the Court.69 Forman,
in part, presented the question whether stock in a cooperative housing project was a security within the "investment contract" definition. The Court rejected the argument that these were "investment
contracts," on the ground that "neither of the kinds of profits traditionally associated with securities was offered to [plaintiffs]." 7
Moreover, the Court stated that Congress intended application of
the securities laws "to turn on the economic realities underlying a
Id. at 298.
a Id. at 298-99.
"

,3See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
,5474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
'

Id. at 483.

, United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
" 421 U.S. 837 (1975).

E.g., Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions under the Federal Securities Laws:
Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891, 906-11 (1977); cf. Brief of the Securities and ExPendulum
The
change Commission, Amicus Curiae at 21, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561
F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977) ("The Formandecision is in no way inconsistent with the principles
enunciated in the previous decisions.").
"

"' 421 U.S. at 854.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[45:124

transaction, and not on the name appended thereto." In stressing
the need to consider "economic realities," however, the Court operated within the framework of the Howey test; indeed, it stated that
the Howey test was the "basic test for distinguishing the transaction
from other commercial dealings. 72 Furthermore, the Court's emphasis on "economic realities" represents a consistent trend
throughout its opinions on investment contracts. In Howey the
Court remarked that form should be "disregarded for substance and
emphasis . . . placed upon economic reality. 7 3 Thus, although
Forman was the first case in which the Supreme Court reversed a
lower court holding that a particular transaction involved an
"investment contract, ' 74 the Court did not depart from the Howey
test.
2. NoncontributoryPension Plans in the Lower Courts. The
only case holding that an interest in a noncontributory private pension plan is an "investment contract" is Daniel v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. 5 The plaintiff in Danielwas denied pension benefits because he had failed to satisfy his union's pension
plan requirement of twenty years of continuous service. Although he
had been a teamster for over twenty-two years, he had been laidoff for four months in 1960-61 because of adverse economic conditions. 7 The district court held that pension plan interests were
"securities" and that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action under
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the
77
1934 Act.
' Id. at 849.
72 Id. at 852.
'
328 U.S. at 298. The Court used almost identical language in Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should
be on economic reality").
71In all of the previous cases, the Supreme Court found that the transaction at issue
involved a security. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (holding a withdrawable
capital share in a savings and loan to be a security); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
387 U.S. 202 (1967) (holding a variable annuity contract with a guaranteed minimum to be
a security); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1965) (holding a variable
annuity contract to be a security); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (holding a
land sales contract in conjunction with a service contract to be a security); SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (holding an oil exploration program in conjunction
with a land lease to be a security).
73410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), petitionfor cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1977) (Nos. 77-753 & 77-754),
1,561 F.2d at 1226. The union's plan provided that an employee who had been laid off
could contribute to the pension fund. Thus, in a sense, the pension plan was neither compulsory nor noncontributory. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Conimission, Amicus Curiae
at 12, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
17 410 F. Supp at 553.
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In affirming the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit
analyzed the Daniel plan in terms of the four elements of the Howey
test.7 8 The court found that an "investment" had been made when
the "employers . . . [put] money into a fund for an employee's
future use which he would otherwise be getting in his paycheck. ' 79
A "common enterprise" was clearly involved in the plan since the
employer's contributions constituted a trust fund in which the beneficiaries had an undivided interest.8 1 Isolating the "profit" element
in the plan presented some difficulty. The court concluded that
since "the expected payout to a beneficiary will exceed the contributions made by the employer on the employee's behalf . . . [t]he
resulting gain would commonly be termed a profit." 8 ' Finally, the
court identified the fourth element-the "managerial efforts of third
parties"-in the trustee's exercise of exclusive control over the pen82
sion fund.
Although the Seventh Circuit seems to have had little difficulty
in concluding that pension plans are a form of investment contract,
other courts have disagreed.13 Unfortunately, the reasoning of these
decisions has not been particularly helpful. In Hurn v. Retirement
Fund Trust of Plumbing, Heating and PipingIndustry,84 for example, the district court apparently thought that the issue was so clear
that no analysis was required. In dismissing the cause of action, the
court merely cited Forman and stated that the "Plaintiffs interest
in the. .. [pension trust fund] is not a 'security' within the meaning of the Securities Law." 8' The court in Wiens v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters" was even less sympathetic to the plaintiff's claim that his pension interest was a security. After asserting
that "for forty years the SEC has said that these pension plan interests were not securities, 8 7 the court declared that "nobody has had
, See text and notes at notes 63-67 supra.
7,561 F.2d at 1232.

The court stated that "the common enterprise can properly take the form of a trust
fund investing in the capital markets where the beneficiaries' common relationship with the
enterprise is an undivided interest in such a trust." Id. at 1233.
' Id. at 1234.

The court stated that "[t]he pension fund trustees self-admittedly exercise exclusive
control over the common enterprise and investment of its assets." Id. at 1233.
" See, e.g., Wiens v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,005 (C.D. Cal. March 28, 1977); Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing, Heating
& Piping Indus., 424 F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
" 424 F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
52

Id. at 81.
[19771 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Id. at 91,519.

96,005 (C.D. Cal. March 28, 1977).
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the temerity to argue that this [pension interest] was a security." 8
The court's assertion is, of course, simply incorrect; the SEC has
consistently maintained that pension interests are "securities"
within the definition of the 1933 Act.89
The Hurn and Wiens decisions can perhaps be supported by the
analysis adopted in Robinson v. UMW Health & Retirement
0 even though
Funds,"
that case did not present the issue of interests
in a noncontributory pension fund. Plaintiffs in Robinson instituted
a class action on behalf of the surviving spouses and dependents of
deceased coal miners seeking a declaration of their rights to permanent health care coverage under the union's health and retirement
plan. The district court dismissed the securities law claim, rejecting
the reasoning of the district court in Daniel on the ground that
Daniel had stretched the definition of a security to a degree
"unwarranted by the realities of the transactions and the function
and purpose of the securities laws."9 1 The court applied the Howey
test and found certain elements lacking:
[T]rust participation involves no "expectation of profit" in
the sense found necessary in Howey and Forman . . . . The
miners, in bargaining for establishment of the Trust [in this
case], were obviously interested in creating a sound, comprehensive health plan, "rather than making an investment for
profit." The Trust simply cannot be characterized as one of the
"countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
9' 2
use of money of others on the promise of profits.
The Daniel and Robinson decisions perhaps could be reconciled
on the basis of the differences between noncontributory pension
plans on the one hand and the health and retirement plan in the
Robinson case on the other.13 But the Robinson court's express rejecId. at 91,521.
"

See text and notes at notes 45-52 supra.

90 435 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977).
"

Id. at 246.

92 Id. at 246-47.
93 Indeed, the Robinson court admitted, without further elaboration, that "Daniel is

distinguishable from the instant case." 435 F. Supp. at 246 n.1. The Seventh Circuit in Daniel
distinguished Robinson partly on the ground that the plaintiffs in Robinson had not themselves contributed anything to the employers in exchange for the employers' payments into
the fund, and that there had therefore been no "sale." 561 F.2d at 1235. The court also
emphasized that there "was no expectation of profit in Robinson because benefits were to be
paid out of the employers' current contributions to the trust rather than from the fund's
capital." Id.

Noncontributory Pension Plans

19771

tion of the district court's analysis in Daniel suggests a sharp disagreement over the proper interpretation of Howey and Forman.9
III.

APPLICATION OF THE INVESTMENT CONTRACT TEST

In Howey, the Supreme Court defined "investment contract"
as a contract "whereby a person invests his money" in a common
enterprise managed by third parties with a reasonable expectation
of receiving a share in the profits of the enterprise. 5 In the pension
plan context, the difficult issue is whether the employee-participant
makes an investment for profit.
A.

The Investment

1. Daniel. A person "invests" in an enterprise when he relinquishes resources to the enterprise in exchange for a right to share
in the income that the enterprise will generate. In the usual case the
investment takes the form of a cash contribution to the enterprise,
but it may take other forms, including the rendering of services.
In the case of noncontributory pensions the employee, by definition, makes no cash contribution. In Daniel the court found that
an investment had been made by the employee through the employer's contribution to the fund because the money contributed
would have gone to the employee as wages in the absence of the
pension plan." The court rejected the view "that there is a controlling conceptual distinction between 'non-contributory' plans and
plans where the employee first receives cash and then pays over
such cash into the pension fund" as a subscription to "undue literalism." If the employer's contributions to the fund are thus linked
to the employee, the noncontributory pension plan can be easily
analogized to a mutual fund. 8
$ The court of appeals' opinion in Danieldid not respond to the Robinson court's statement that the application of the securities laws to the fact situation in Daniel was
"unwarranted by the realities of the transactions."
'5 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). See text and notes at notes 60-74 supra.
561 F.2d at 1232.
'7 561 F.2d at 1243. A similar theory is set forth in de Roode, Pensions as Wages, 3 AM.
EcoN. Rav. 287 (1913). The Daniel court relied on a discussion in Mundheim & Henderson,
supra note 9, at 803-04. However, their discussion concerns the characterization of the pension
trust. Mundheim and Henderson use the characterization of the Senate Labor Committee
that "[riegardless of the form they take, the employers' share of the cost of these plans or
the benefits the employers provide are a form of compensation," S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1958), to reach the conclusion that the pension trust is "created for business
purposes and is not non-commercial." Mundheim & Henderson, supra note 9, at 804. This is
contrasted with the view that "the creation of a pension plan by an employer . . . [is] a
gift .... Id. at 803.
'" Former SEC Chairman Cohen explained to the Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the
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To support its view that the employer's contributions represent
the employee's investment the court turned to its decision in Inland
Steel Co. v. NLRB.11 In Inland Steel, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that pension and retirement benefits are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. 00 The
court there stated that "realistically viewed, this type of wage enhancement or increase .
becomes an integral part of the entire
wage structure."'' The Daniel court apparently reasoned that retirement benefits are the functional equivalent of wages paid for
services rendered because employees, through their collective bargaining agent, can trade off retirement benefits against present
wages. The "realism" of the Inland Steel case is hardly compelling
support for this view. Although a pension plan may be a collectively
bargained-for "condition of employment," it does not follow that
individual pension interests are purchased by foregone wages.
2. JudicialTreatment of Pension Interests in Other Contexts.
It will be helpful, taking a cue from Daniel, to examine how courts
have viewed interests in noncontributory pension plans for other
legal purposes.
Pension plans were originally viewed as gratuitous in nature., 2
But the view that the employer receives no benefit in exchange for
the pension interest did not seem to accord with reality, and the
legal consequences of the theory were harsh. In response most jurisdictions repudiated the gratuity theory and now view noncontributory pension plans as contracts.13 The contract, however, does not
arise until the employee satisfies the plan's vesting requirements.10 4
Senate Committee on Labor & Public Welfare: "In many respects, pension plans and mutual
funds have features in common. . . .First, both investor and employee are investing money
which they have earned. .

.

.Both the investor and the employee.

. .

place their confidence

and trust in an administrator who is in a position to exercise expert judgment concerning the
management of their funds ...." Hearings on S. 3598 before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1972).
,9170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied in part, 336 U.S. 960 (1949), afl'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
'® Id. at 249.
l' Id.
10 See, e.g., McNeven v. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898), aff'd
without opinion, 167 N.Y. 530, 60 N.E. 115 (1901) (the first case explicitly dealing with this
issue and holding that a pension was an "inchoate gift"); Friedman v. Romaine, 77 Misc. 2d
134, 140, 352 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357 (Sup. Ct. 1974) ("It has long been the law with respect to
pension plans. . . which are not the outgrowth of collective bargaining agreement that...
the benefits conferred thereby are gratuities."). See generally B. AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF

5-9 (1961).
I" See, e.g., Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1975); Morse v. J. Ray

EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER PRWATE PENSION PLANS

McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353, 1357 (La. 1977). See also Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 461 (1955).
"I See B. AARON, supra note 102, at 9-10; A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 153 (1952); Annot.,

42 A.L.R.2d 461, 468-69 (1955).
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The pension plan is conceptualized as an offer by the employer that
the employee can accept only by fulfilling all the vesting requirements, typically including the requirement that the employee remain in the employer's service for a stated period of time., 5 If the
employee fails to satisfy the vesting requirements, there is no acceptance, and hence no contract."°6 According to Corbin, "part performance of the bargained for consideration, forming a part of the
expected process of acceptance, is now held to make the offer irrevocable although the duty of the offeror is conditional upon completion by the offeree."'' '
Despite the consensus that an employer receives value in exchange for the benefits paid out under a noncontributory plan,' 8 the
courts enforce the pension contract in strict accordance with its
terms.' 0 They "have been uniformly reluctant to grant terminated
"' See, e.g., Taylor v. Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff's Retirement Bd., 265 Or. 445,
510 P.2d 339 (1973).
I" See, e.g., Taylor v. General Tel. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 70, 97 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1971).
"1 A. CORBIN, supra note 104, § 153 at 224.
I" Because'the employer receives value it should be clear that noncontributory pension
plans involve a sale or offer to sell a pension interest.
The SEC once took the position that such plans were not subject to the securities laws
because "no 'offer' or 'sale' is involved in the case of a non-contributory plan." Op. SEC Ass't
Gen. Counsel, supra note 25, at 1104.101. As explained by SEC Commissioner Purcell, the
SEC viewed pension interests as bonuses or gifts. 1941 Hearings,supra note 26, at 896. The
SEC's position accorded with the view of many courts at that time that pension interests were
gifts. That view appears indefensible now that most courts view pensions as contracts. See
text and notes at notes 102-107 supra. Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970),
defines "sale" to include "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a
security for value." The 1934 Act definition drops the "for value" requirement: "sale" includes "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of" a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970).
Under a literal reading of the 1934 Act definition there would be no difficulty finding a sale.
Even under the apparently less inclusive definition found in the 1933 Act, it appears that the
pension transaction is a sale or an offer to sell. The vesting provisions of the pension plan
insure that the employer will receive "value" in exchange for the pension interest. Regardless
of when the actual sale can be said to occur, the pension plan is easily conceptualized as an
offer to transfer a pension interest "for value."
Indeed, the SEC partially abandoned its "no-sale" position in its amicus brief in Daniel,
and urged upon the court the theory that noncontributory pension plans involve a sale for
antifraud purposes, but not for registration purposes. Brief of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Amicus Curiae at 35-41, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir. 1977). The court agreed, reasoning that in view of the different purposes of the
antifraud and registration provisions, "a narrow view of 'sale' would be most inappropriate
as to fraudulent activity." 561 F.2d at 1244. The SEC's dichotomous sale theory is difficult
to justify because "sale" under both acts has a single definition for all purposes. It could be
argued, given the absence from the 1934 Act definition of the "for value" limitation found in
the 1933 Act, that it is easier to find a sale for 10b-5 purposes than for registration purposes,
but neither the SEC nor the Daniel court relied on that variance. They drew a distinction
not between the two acts but between the 1933 Act's registration provisions and the antifraud
provisions of both acts.
10 See, e.g., International Union, United Steel Workers v. International Sys. & Controls
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employees vested rights in a non-contributory pension fund where
the terms of the pension contract have not been literally met." 10
The strict approach of the courts does not accord with the Daniel
court's view that the employer's contributions to the pension fund
are in reality funds the employee "would otherwise be getting in his
paycheck." ' If pension contributions would otherwise be received
as present wages, it might be expected that the courts would recognize a substantial performance doctrine or an unjust enrichment
remedy"' in this area. That they have not suggests that the courts
see the pension exchange differently from the Daniel court.
This theoretical conflict is well illustrated by the recent case of
Morse v. J. Ray McDermott Co.113 In Morse, an employee who participated in a retirement plan with a fifteen-year vesting period was
dismissed from his job after more than eleven years of continuous
employment. On first hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that when "the employee is prevented from performing his part of
the bargain to complete vesting of deferred compensation benefits," ' the non-vesting clause is "unenforceable" as contrary to the
state law policy against "wage forfeitures."" 5 On rehearing, the
court reversed itself and ruled that employees do not acquire enforceable rights by mere service: "There is no awarding, or setting
aside, in the years of employment, of any sum to the credit of the
employee. There is not even a promise, or statement, that the employee has 'earned' anything in the retirement plan during his first
fourteen years of company service.""' The employer's contribution,
Corp., No. 76-1459 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 1977); Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975);
Knoll v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 465 F.2d 1128, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126
(1973); Schneider v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366, 373 (6th Cir. 1972); Hudson v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1963); Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958); Hardy v. H.K. Porter Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Avondale Mills v. Saddler, 290 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 1974); Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg.
Co., 77 Wash. 2d 911, 920-21, 468 P.2d 666, 672 (1970); Zeimaitis v. Burlington Mills, Inc.,
56 Wis.2d 449, 459, 202 N.W.2d 244, 249 (1972).
,, Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 342 (D. Minn. 1967).
II 561 F.2d at 1232.
,,Z
The unjust enrichment approach has been almost unanimously rejected. See, e.g.,
International Union, United Steel Workers v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., No. 761459 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 1977); Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975); Knoll v.
Phoenix Steel Corp., 465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); Hardy
v. H.K. Porter Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Zeimaitis v. Burlington Mills, Inc.,
56 Wis.2d 449, 202 N.W.2d 244 (1972). But see Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338
(D. Minn. 1967).
"1 344 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1977).
' Id. at 1358.
,, Id. at 1358-59.
,, Id. at 1369.
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according to Morse, is not linked to employee service. The court
refused to look beyond the terms of the bargain in order to identify
any employee equity.
The leading case that seems to adopt the Daniel "deferred
wage" theory is Lucas v. Seagrave Corp."7 In Lucas, thirty employees who had lost their rights to pension benefits when they were
dismissed by the defendant following its purchase of the employer's
corporation sued for their accrued pension rights on a theory of
quasi-contract. The court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment and held that the plaintiffs could recover if they showed
that the defendant had terminated the relationship in a bad faith
effort to "recapture" the plaintiffs' benefits.' The termination, the
court stated, "operates only as a revocation of the employees' power
of acceptance of the whole contract," and "[t]he employer must
still return benefits conferred by the employee as a result of his
service.""'
Later decisions have explained Lucas as an attempt to find an
exception for a "group termination."'' 0 Even though the Lucas court
realized that "an employer's pension plan contributions are determined by an actuarial formula which assumes that any employee
1 21
it
whose employment is terminated forfeits his pension benefits,
'
2
was nonetheless troubled by the "windfall"' the defendant would
receive because of the group termination. The court need not have
relied on the theory that pension benefits "are commonly substituted for direct cash wages,' ' 23 nor is it clear that it did.2 4 Regardless of the nature and source of the benefit to the employer from
having a pension plan it is clear that mass termination of jobs and
hence benefit expectancies enables the employer to avoid incurring
any obligations after having received substantial benefit.
3. Economic Reality. The general judicial treatment of the
,27
277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967).
" Id. at 346.

"I Id. at 345.
12 See, e.g., Hardy v. H.K. Porter Co., 417 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
,2,
277 F. Supp. at 345.

Id.

122

" Id. at 343.
12 The Lucas court found the possibility of unjust enrichment not in the employer's
retention of the employees' "deferred wages" but in the "windfall" accruing to the employer
from a group termination:
[Ain employer who has discharged a relatively large number of employees receives a
windfall. . . in the form of pension credit forfeitures which he can use to relieve for some
time his future premium liability for the remaining employees. It seems unrealistic to
say in this context . . . that the employer receives nothing.
Id. at 345.
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pension contract suggests that the courts do not see an identity
between forgone wages and employer contributions. In the recent
case of Alabama Power Co. v. Davis,'25 the Supreme Court adopted
the view, for purposes of applying section 9 of the Military Selective
Services Act,'26 that the "true nature" of a defined benefit pension
"is a reward for length of service.""12 The Court noted that "pension
payments have some resemblance to compensation for work performed,' 1 28 but concluded that pension benefits are designed as rewards for lengthy service: "It is difficult to maintain that a pension
increment is deferred compensation for a year of actual service when
it is only the passage of years in the same company's employ, and
not the service rendered, that entitles the employee to that increment."' 29
The Alabama Power opinion provides the more accurate portrayal of noncontributory pension plans. The relationship between
pension benefits and forgone wages is tenuous at best. Elimination
of a pension plan would not necessarily produce an increase in current employee compensation. The vesting provisions generally present in pension plans tend to promote personnel stability by providing an incentive for employees to remain with their employer. 3 ' As
the Court said in Alabama Power, "By rewarding lengthy service, a
plan may reduce employee turnover and training costs and help an
employer secure the benefits of a stable work force." 3 ' One of the
benefits of personnel stability may be increased employee productivity, and it is conceivable that the reduction in training costs and
higher productivity might actually "pay" for some pension plans.
I431 U.S. 581 (1977).
38 U.S.C. § 2021 (Supp. V 1975).
,' 431 U.S. at 593.
22

'12 Id.
12,Id.

at 592.
at 593.

"' See, e.g., Litwicki v. PPG Industries, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 296, 305 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd, 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974) ("the primary purpose of the retirement benefit is to promote
personnel stability by giving the employee an incentive to remain with the company").
" 431 U.S. at 592 n.16. The magnitude of the turnover problem is suggested by one labor
economist's estimate, based on Bureau of Labor statistics, "that upwards of 10 million people,
or one-sixth of all wage and salary earners, change jobs in a typical year." L. REYNOLDS, LABOR
ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATiONs 60 (5th ed. 1970) (footnote omitted). The expense to employers is manifold:
Costs of labor turnover to the employer are both direct and indirect. There are the
bookkeeping costs involved in taking persons on and off the payroll, an item which has
increased with the extra records and reporting entailed in the government social security
problems. The greatest expense is that incurred in the interviewing, selection, and
breaking in of new workers. . . .During this period of training and breaking in, the new
employee's output is naturally low, causing an increase in unit labor costs.
F. PETERSON, SURVEY OF LABOR ECONoMics 207-08 (rev. ed. 1951).
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Even if elimination of pension plans would free some resources, it
is not clear, especially in view of the tax advantages of pension
arrangements,"'3 that those resources would necessarily be passed on
33
to employees in the form of increased wages.
Thus, the Daniel court's view of the relationship between employee services and the employer's contributions is too facile. The
nature of the pension exchange is far more complex. The
"investment" made by any individual employee is his remaining on
the particular job beyond the time he would otherwise have departed. This "investment"-the employee's opportunity cost-does
not, however, translate into funds contributed by the employer.
B.

Profits and Profit Motivation

The absence of any tangible employee investment makes it
difficult to find an element of profit in the pension transaction. The
employee's expected profit would be the difference between the
employee's investment or cost of participation in the pension plan
and the pension benefit he expects to receive.' 34 The Daniel court
found the profit element in the difference between the expected
benefits and the "contributions made by the employer on the employee's behalf."' 35 However, this analysis does not withstand scrutiny. The court erred in equating the employee's cost with the employer's contribution on the employee's "behalf." In a noncontributory, defined benefit pension plan the employee has no right whatever to the contributions made on his behalf. Prior to vesting the
employee has neither a right to the contributions made on his behalf
nor a right to pension benefits.' 36 Subsequent to vesting the emSee I.R.C. § 404; Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(i), T.D. 6887, 1966-2 C.B. 129. The
primary advantage of receiving compensation in the form of pension benefits is tax deferral.
Moreover, if the pension plan "qualifies" under the Internal Revenue Code, the employer can
deduct his contributions to the pension fund as an ordinary business expense. See generally
4A J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ch. 25B (rev. ed. 1972).
233 It
is possible that dropping a pension demand would yield no additional salary
at all-for example, where an employer wished to match the prevailing salary and
benefit levels, and was unwilling to vary the composition of his wage-benefit package
because he believed that such action would impair business relationships or make it
more difficult to attract new employees.
Brief of Secretary of Labor, Amicus Curiae at 17, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
"3 In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975), the Supreme
Court stated that "[bly profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment . . . or a participation in earnings resulting
from the use of investors' funds."
' 561 F.2d at 1234.
' See text at notes 103-124 supra.
2
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ployee does not acquire a right to contributions made on his behalf
but rather an enforceable contractual right to promised pension
benefits.' 7 The contributions by the employer do not represent the
employee's costs but the employer's actuarially-determined cost of
maintaining the pension plan."' The employee's "investment" consists of the opportunity costs he incurs by remaining in the particular employment until his pension rights have vested. It is impossible
to determine whether the expected benefits "exceed" the employee's opportunity costs, for the costs seem to defy quantification.
The motivation behind the employee's participation in a pension plan cannot be characterized as "expectation of profit." It may
be said that the employee views the pension arrangement as favorable in that he values the possibility of a secure retirement income
more highly than the opportunities he loses by remaining with his
employer until vesting. But that preference is not a profit expectation within the meaning of the Supreme Court's investment contract cases. In United Housing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman,"9 the
Court stated that "[bly profits, the Court has meant either capital
appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment . . . or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of
investors' funds . . . . In such cases the investor is 'attracted solely
by the prospects of a return' on his investment.""' The Forman
Court labeled the theory that the mere favorability of an exchange
supplies the profit element "an inappropriate theory of 'profits' that
we cannot accept."''
The role of the profit expectation branch of the Howey test is
crucial. The promise of profits supplies the powerful lure that the
protections of the federal securities laws are designed to counteract. 2 That lure is absent in the case of noncontributory, defined
'31 If the employee had a right to the contributions made on his behalf, then the pension
plan would be a defined contribution pension plan rather than a defined benefit pension plan.
See note 4 supra.
"I Attribution of contributions to employees in an economic sense rests upon a fundamental confusion. Specifically, it confuses a method of funding an obligation with the obligation itself. One commentator has noted this problem:
Any consideration of employee. . . benefit plans must make a sharp distinction between
two factual levels. The first is the level of the individual plan and the relation to it of
the employee participants. The second is the level of the investment medium which is
used to fund the individual plan and the relation to that medium of the employer who
sets up the plan and chooses the investing medium.
Mundheim & Henderson, supra note 9, at 837.
"' 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
24 Id. at 852.
"'Id. at 855.
12 In Howey, the Court emphasized that investors were "attracted by the expectation of
substantial profits." 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946).
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benefit pension plans. In the final analysis, noncontributory, defined benefit pension plans-like cooperative housing arrangements' 3-are not rivals to mutual funds, variable annuities, withdrawable capital shares or any of the other "countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of money of others on
the promise of profits.' ' 4
IV.

WHY SECURITIES REGULATION?

The preceding section has argued that interests in noncontributory, defined benefit plans are not "investment contracts" under the
Supreme Court's tests. Even so, employees who participate in a
plan acquire a reliance interest over years of service, an interest that
certainly deserves protection. But analysis of the risks associated
with noncontributory plans, and of the congressional response to the
need for protection against those risks, suggests that securities law
protection is unnecessary and perhaps obstructive of congressional
policy goals.
Pension plans have been subject to federal regulation for some
time.'4 5 Given the scope of protection provided by ERISA, and the
general understanding, at the time of its enactment, that the securities laws did not apply to interests in noncontributory plans, 4 ' it
could be argued that ERISA preempts the field. Nevertheless, proponents of the view that pension interests are securities assert that
securities law disclosure is a necessary complement to ERISA's requirements.' 47
The federal securities laws would require disclosure of all material facts, including "risk of loss,' 48 prior to the investment decision. By contrast, "ERISA disclosure limits itself to the plan provisions without a particularizing of how or how likely benefits may be
lost,"' 4 and disclosure may be made as late as ninety days after the
See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
"

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). See M.

BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF

PRIVATE PENSIONS 9 (1964). ("Of course, the basic purpose of private pension plans is to

provide income to those who have worked and who retire from choice or necessity. Undoubtedly most unions and employers sincerely desire that employees have fully adequate retirement income.").
"' See generally Chadwick & Foster, FederalRegulation of Retirement Plans: The Quest
for Parity, 28 VAN. L. REV. 641 (1975).
" See text and notes at notes 37-42 supra, and note 161 infra.
" See, e.g., Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1248 (7th Cir.
1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1977). (Nos. 77-753 & 77-754).
,,g
Id.
I49

Id.
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employee becomes a plan participant.15 Thus, it is argued, application of the securities laws would complement ERISA by requiring
"full disclosure of the terms of the plan and risks associated with
it" at the time an employee is offered a job. 151
The argument that securities law protection is needed because
of gaps in ERISA disclosure is not persuasive. For one thing, the
inequitable conduct usually connected with noncontributory pensions is not fraudulent inducement to take employment, but fraudulent or unfair inducement to remain on the job, a wrong that preemployment "disclosure" will not remedy.1 2 Secondly, if disclosure is
really desirable it would seem that the registration provisions-the
disclosure provisions of the securities acts-should apply. But Congress exempted the bulk of private pensions from registration in
1970,1 3 and the SEC maintains, as did the Daniel court, that registration is not required.'5 4
Moreover, securities laws disclosure is an inappropriate means
of protecting employees against the kinds of risks associated with
noncontributory, defined benefit pension plans. Noncontributory
pension plans involve two sorts of risks. One risk is that the employee will fail to satisfy the plan's vesting requirements. The other
risk is that the fund will prove inadequate to provide the contractedfor benefits. ERISA deals with both sorts of risk, not by requiring
complete disclosure, but by substantive regulation. 5 Implicit in
ERISA is a legislative judgment that disclosure is an inadequate
remedy for the ills of the private pension system.
Included in the second sort of risk-the risk that the pension
fund will prove insufficient to provide the contracted-for benefits-is a risk that might be called an "investment risk." It is the
risk that the fund will be inadequate as a result of poor investment
decisions by plan trustees. But this "investment risk" is far differERISA § 104(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
Brief for the Institute for Public Interest Representation, Amicus Curiae at 5, Daniel
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
152 According to SEC Chairman Williams, testifying before the Senate Human Resources
Subcommittee on Labor, ERISA's requirement of disclosure 90 days after employment in the
form of a summary plan description would be just as adequate as preemployment notification
with respect to investment in a plan. 159 PENS. REP. (BNA) A-16 (Oct. 17, 1977).
I The 1970 Investment Company Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413
(1970) (codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1970)), specifically exempts
most pension interests from registration. One estimate is that 96% of all pension plans are
now exempt from registration. See Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223,
1250 n.61 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1977) (Nos.
77-753 & 77-754).
'
See note 108 supra.
's See text and note at note 159 infra.
ISO
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ent from that associated with the typical securities transaction. In
the case of the pension plan, the "investment risk" falls principally
upon the employer: the employer must increase contributions to the
fund in years subsequent to poor investment performance in order
to offset the poor performance and keep the fund fully "funded."
Moreover, the "investment risk" associated with the pension plan
is not uncontrolled, as it typically is in the case of mutual funds,
variable annuities, and other similar sorts of securities transactions.
The "investment risk" of the pension plan is controllable to the
extent that investment performance is accurately taken into account by the actuarial assumptions and calculations employed in
funding the pension. In fact, if actuarial science operated with certainty, there would be no investment risk involved in the noncontributory, defined benefit pension plan-at least from the standpoint
of the employee. This suggests that it is not disclosure of
"investment risks" that is needed but rather regulation of funding
and actuarial assumptions, and this is exactly what the Internal
Revenue Code and ERISA do.'56
The major risk involved-and that with which the Daniel case
was actually concerned-is the risk that the participant will inadvertently fail to satisfy a prerequisite to vesting.' 7 As the Senate
Report accompanying ERISA noted, "In almost every instance, participants lose their benefits not because of some violation of federal
law, but rather because of the manner in which the plan is executed
with respect to its contractual requirements of vesting or funding."' 8 ERISA attempts to remedy this problem through minimum
vesting standards and rules regulating loss of rights resulting from
a break in employee service.'5
" See I.R.C. §§ 412, 4971; ERISA §§ 301-305, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085 (Supp. V 1975)
(funding requirements); I.R.C. § 412(c)(3); ERISA § 302(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(3) (Supp.
V 1975) (actuarial assumptions).
,' See W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, supra note 1, at 155.
'ss S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1973).
,' See ERISA § 203(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (minimum vesting
standards); ERISA § 203(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975) (break-in-service
rules).
As explained in the Secretary of Labor's amicus brief in Daniel:
A "break in service" rule that cuts off eligibility for pension benefits because of a few
months' involuntary lay-off in the midst of a 22 year period of otherwise continuous
covered service is not only arbitrary; it is unfair in the extreme, shocking to the conscience. Before the passage of ERISA, when employee benefit plans were not required
to meet any substantive minimum standards, examples of similar inequities were legion.
The prevalence of such unjust results was one of the primary motivating forces leading
to adoption of the minimum standards for plan participation, vesting and benefit accrual.
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Although securities laws protection of interests covered by
ERISA appears unnecessary, ERISA does not protect those who,
like the plaintiff in Daniel, lost their pension rights prior to the
effective date of the Act. If ERISA's regulations applied retroactively, such employees could earn reinstatement of their pension
rights under the Act's break-in-service rules, and the need for a
securities antifraud remedy would be less urgent. But the nonretroactivity of ERISA is not accidental. The decision to make the Act
nonretroactive was the product of a conscious compromise between
remedial purpose and the desire to avoid disrupting existing pension
plans. 6 ' The kind of liability envisioned by the Daniel complaint
could seriously disrupt existing plans. It would be retroactive in the
sense that the liability is premised on conduct that was not previously believed to be violative of the securities laws 6 ' and that the
employer is now powerless to undo.
Moreover, the theory of the Daniel complaint, though fashioned
primarily to meet a particular remedial lacuna, cannot logically be
limited to cases in which employees lost their rights prior to the
effective date of ERISA. Employees protected by ERISA's minimum vesting standards and break-in-service rules might nevertheless find a securities cause of action an attractive alternative. The
availability of such actions would require of employers disclosures
the scope of which is unknown. In response to queries concerning the
kinds of disclosure that would be required in order to avoid antiBrief of the Secretary of Labor, Amicus Curiae at 20-21, Daniel v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
,so Congressman Thompson of New Jersey explained on the floor of the House:
I am proud to say that I believe we have reconciled the competing interests of participants and pension plan sponsors in a way that speeds the protection of the new standards
without creating undue financial dislocation or immediate disruption of existing pension
plans. By way of explanation, I would draw the attention of my colleagues to the provisions dealing with the effective dates for the vesting, participation and eligibility provisions contained in part 2 of title I. Under the conference substitute the provisions with
respect to participation and vesting will apply to new pension plans in plan years beginning after the date of enactment of the conference report. For pension plans in existence
on January 1, 1974, the general effective date of the participation and vesting provisions
is to be plan years beginning after December 31, 1975.
120 CONG. REC. 29195 (1974).
6I At no time during the period of ERISA's development was it ever stated to me
or, to the best of my knowledge, to any other member of Congress that the Securities
Acts' antifraud provisions applied to noncontributory, involuntary pension plans. ...
The lack of notice is very important because, given the delicate balance Congress
sought to strike in ERISA, notice that the antifraud provisions were applicable to a fact
situation such as that in Daniel certainly would have been a matter worthy of legislative
consideration . ...
Letter from Senator Williams to SEC Chairman Williams (Dec. 13, 1977), reprinted in 168
PENS. REP. (BNA) R-19, R-20 (Dec. 19, 1977).
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fraud liability, the SEC has said only that it is essentially a "caseby-case" matter. 6 2 To impose disclosure duties in addition to those
imposed by ERISA seems plainly contrary to Congress's intent to
minimize the burdens on the private pension system." 3 As Congressman Ullman stated:
I want to emphasize that these new [ERISA] requirements
have been carefully designed to provide adequate protection for
employees and at the same time, provide a favorable setting for
the growth and development of private pension plans. It is
axiomatic to anyone who has worked for any time in this area
that pension plans cannot be expected to develop if costs are
made overly burdensome, particularly for employers who generally foot most of the bill. This would be self-defeating and
would be unfavorable rather than helpful to the employees for
whose benefit this legislation [ERISA] is designed.'6 4
In ERISA Congress has carefully balanced the costs and benefits of
participant protection. The courts should not upset that balance by
applying the federal securities laws to transactions not properly
within their scope.165
CONCLUSION

This comment has argued that employee interests in noncontributory, defined benefit private pension plans are not "securities"
subject to the federal securities laws. Such interests are not investment contracts under the Howey "investment contract" test be,"' "The listing of various items of information to be disclosed to plan participants...
is part of the realm of registration requirements of the federal securities laws. There is, and
can be, no definite list of items which must be disclosed under the antifraud provisions."
Memorandum from the SEC Office of General Counsel to SEC Chairman Williams (Dec. 7,
1977), reprintedin 168 PENS. REP. (BNA) R-17, R-18 (Dec. 19, 1977). The memorandum states
that the touchstone under the antifraud provisions is "the concept of materiality" and
"materiality must be judged on a case-by-case basis." Id.
I" Senator Williams, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor, and co-sponsor of ERISA, has expressed concern
that the Daniel decision might result in upsetting the "delicate balance Congress sought to
strike in ERISA." Letter from Senator Williams to SEC Chairman Williams, supra note 160,
at R-20. In the Foreword to the Legislative History of ERISA Senator Williams wrote: "The
new rules [of ERISA] reflect a careful balance of incentives and controls designed by Congress to improve the equitable character of private plans while encouraging their future
growth and development." I SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94th Cong., 2d

Sess.,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF

(1976).
I,,

120

CONG. REC.

1974, at III

29198 (1974).

'1 "[N]ot every plan generating allegations of fraud is a violation of federal securities
law." Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 695 (3d Cir. 1973).
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cause of the difficulty in identifying a measurable employee investment and because of the difficulty in identifying the requisite profit
in the pension transaction. These factors, buttressed by policy considerations, indicate that the extension of federal securities law protection to noncontributory, defined benefit pension interests is unwarranted.
Robert V. Gunderson,Jr.

